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Since it opened, the Smithsonian's National Museum of the American
Indian has been criticized. The decision of the Museum not to tell the story of
tribal life, particularly the history of contact with non-Indians, in a linear,
scholarly fashion is faulted by many, critics and visitors alike. The primary
permanent exhibits, "Our Peoples" and "Our Universes," give space to
selected tribes to tell the stories of their lives and their beliefs.' According to
a New York Times review of the Museum, the result is a "monotony" of similar
stories; the review harshly explains that "[t]he notion that tribal voices should
be heard becomes a problem when the selected voices have so little to say."2
The main message of the tribal voices featured in the Museum's permanent
exhibits is twofold: we (continue to) exist, and this is who we are as a people.
Tellingly, Kevin Gover, Director of the Museum and former Arizona State
University law professor, recently observed, "I'm stunned by the number of
people who are angry when they come to the museum and see it is about
Indians who are still here, rather than Indians who used to be."'
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law; Research
Affiliate, National Poverty Center, University of Michigan.
1. For more on the Museum, including a description ofthe exhibits, see National Museum
of the American Indian, http://www.americanindian.si.edulindex.cfm (last visited Aug. 10,
2010).
2. Edward Rothstein, Museum with an American Indian Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2004, at El.
3. Press Release, Sandra Day O'Connor Coll. of Law, Ariz. State Univ., Gover Addresses
'White Man's Indian' in Canby Lecture (Jan. 2010), http://www.myazbar.org/AZBarInfo/News
PDFs/Gover-Canby/ 20Lecture.pdf.
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Former Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justice Raymond Austin's
impressive work, Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law,4 embraces the
same assertion of continued tribal existence and the importance of identity that
inspires criticism of the Museum. Similarly, by exploring in detail the ideas
and values underlying Navajo common law and showing their continued
relevance today before Navajo courts, Austin highlights the importance of
grounded understandings of tribal justice systems. The book unapologetically
embraces a Navajo-centric perspective and resists generalizing to pan-Indian
history, experience, and governance forms. Navajo Courts and Navajo
Common Law can be appreciated on multiple levels. The message to the
general reader is simple: Navajo courts and Navajo law are distinctly Navajo.
Din6 (the word Navajos use for themselves, which means "the People")
beliefs, values, and customs play an important role in defining the content and
practice of justice and law in the Navajo Nation. But beneath this simplicity
lies a rich discussion of how three Din6 values-hbzh6, k', and k'i-are used
in practice by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.
The study of tribal law has not kept up with the practice of tribal law;
scholars and scholarship are falling behind tribal-court jurisprudence and the
work of tribal judges. Considering the marginalized place of Indian nations,
this is not surprising. Except for tribal members or those living near
reservations, most people probably think the U.S. political system consists of
two types of sovereigns: states and the federal government.' Tribal
sovereignty is not generally appreciated, and the possibility that tribes may call
on their customs to resolve disputes arising on reservations is certainly not
contemplated. Students can easily graduate from law school having
encountered, at most, a passing mention of Indian tribes.' Among Indian law
scholars, tribal law-the law of particular tribes-takes a back seat to research
on the (mis)treatment of Indian sovereignty by the U.S. Supreme Court.' That
4. RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF
TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009).
5. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L.
REv. 225, 262 (1994) (noting the persistence of tribes "as the third sovereign within the United
States' borders").
6. First, the majority of law schools do not have tenured or tenure-track faculty who work
on Indian law issues and may only offer an Indian law class on an ad hoc basis. Second, with
a few possible exceptions such as Williams v. Lee in Civil Procedure and Johnson v. M'Intosh
in Property, required classes often include no acknowledgment of this other form of sovereignty
within the United States. Perhaps nowhere is the absence of coverage more striking than it is
in most Constitutional law classes.




is not to say that scholars have not made valuable contributions to the study of
tribal law,' only that there is ample room for such scholarship. With the
increased public availability of tribal-court decisions thanks to the internet and
the high caseloads of tribal judiciaries,' the timing of former Navajo Nation
Supreme Court Justice Austin's coverage of Navajo common law is excellent
and hopefully is on the leading edge of a wave of similar scholarship."o
Finally, Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law is particularly timely in
light of the Navajo Nation's ongoing struggle to define the powers of its
President, Supreme Court, and Council. Austin, while referring obliquely to
"the turmoil" of 1989 related to the power struggles and controversies between
those who opposed and those who supported Navajo Tribal Chairman Peter
MacDonald, Sr.," primarily writes about tribal customs, not about politics.
Nonetheless, by asserting the importance of Navajo customary or common
law, Austin ends up taking a stand for the Navajo Nation Supreme Court and
the rule of law.
These are exciting times for the Navajo Nation: the President has been
pushing to reduce the size of the Council, tribal courts invalidated the
U.S. Supreme Court arguablyjustifies such a focus by the Indian law scholarly community. See
also Robert B. Porter, Cleaning Up the Colonizer's Mess: An Important Role for Legal
Scholarship About the Indigenous Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 431, 431-32 (2002), who makes
the same descriptive claim in noting that few full-time professors write about tribal law because
"the emphasis of 'Indian law' scholarship was, and continues to be, the area I refer to as 'federal
Indian control law').
8. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285
(1998). The writings of a former clerk of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Paul Spruhan, are
particularly good examples of how tribal law provides a lens onto federal Indian law. See, e.g.,
Paul Spruhan, The Origins, Current Status, and Future Prospects of Blood Quantum as the
Definition ofMembership in the Navajo Nation, 8 TRIBAL L.J. 1 (2007-2008); Paul Spruhan,
Case Note: Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in
Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. 2 (2000-200 1).
9. Tribal court decisions can be found on the commercial databases of Westlaw.com and
Versuslaw.com, as well as on the website ofthe Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/decision.htm. Some tribal courts have begun posting their opinions online as
well. See, e.g., Navajo Nation Supreme Court Opinions, http://www.navajocourts.org/suct
opinions.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
10. In as small a field as Indian law, the 2008 publication of Professor Justin Richland's
examination of Hopi tribal courts and the 2009 publication of Justice Austin's book suggest at
least a small wave has already begun. See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADmON:
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN HoPI TRIBAL COURT (2008).
11. AusTIN, supra note 4, at 95.
381No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
Council's suspension of the President, and the Council unsuccessfully tried to
reduce the role of customary law in tribal courts. The Navajo Nation does not
have a constitution, and the question remains open which branch of
government should have final say on the powers of the executive, judicial, and
legislative branches. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court responded to the
recent political turmoil by issuing a series of opinions that amount to an
updated Navajo version of Marbury v. Madison. The supreme court protected
the idea of separate and coordinate branches of Navajo government by
blocking a power grab by the Council and established the supremacy of
Navajo Nation Supreme Court interpretations of customary law. The Navajo
Nation Supreme Court's heavy reliance on customary law when resolving this
and future moments of "turmoil" is strongly supported by Austin's Navajo
Courts and Navajo Common Law.
I. Navajo Customary or Common Law
Former Justice Raymond Austin is ideally suited to write about customary
law, but Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law's main contribution is to
link customary practices and values to cases decided by the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court. Austin wrote Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law as a
Ph.D dissertation with Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. as his advisor.
Professor Williams's foreword places Austin's focus on Navajo common law
into the context of federal Indian law and the U.S. Supreme Court's ongoing
efforts to diminish tribal jurisdiction. Austin, however, was not a typical Ph.D
student; he started studying at the University of Arizona only after serving on
the Navajo Nation Supreme Court from 1985 to 2001. On tribal law, and
especially on Navajo tribal law, few people can match Austin's level of
experience and mastery. The book reflects Austin's confidence in writing a
career capstone project that showcases his depth of knowledge about Navajo
law, moving fluidly between theory, oral history, and the decisions of the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court.
The book's introductory chapter begins with the Navajo creation story and
ends with Austin acknowledging that other Din6 might view things differently
than he does and differently from the traditional Din6 education he received
from his grandmother. The book's roadmap includes two chapters of
background on the Navajo court system and the procedures for using and
arguing the applicability of Navajo common law. Early on-a quarter of the
way into the book-Austin turns to "three foundational doctrines that form the
nucleus" of his book: "h6zh6 (glossed as harmony, balance, and peace); k'




clan system)."12 Austin explains that the goal of the book is to "encourage"
indigenous peoples to make use of "their own cultural norms, values, and
traditional institutions" to solve the challenges they face."
An introduction to the Navajo Nation and the history of the Navajo Nation
court system provides the background for Austin's discussion of the h6zh6,
k'd, and k'i doctrines. The Navajo Nation is roughly the size of West
Virginia and spans across Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Although
"298,197 individuals identified themselves as Navajo" on the 2000 Census, 4
the total Navajo population living on the reservation was 165,673, according
to the same census." The Din6 traditionally consider their homeland to be
more expansive-defined by four sacred mountains-but their territory is now
defined by the Treaty of 1868 and subsequent additions to the land described
in the treaty. The Treaty of 1868 came only after Navajos had been subjected
to a four-year imprisonment at Fort Sumner on the Bosque Redondo
Reservation, following a harsh military campaign and the forced exile that
began with "The Long Walk." 6 In the language of the U.S. Supreme Court,
Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations," whose sovereignty has long
been acknowledged by the United States.'" "The 1868 Navajo Treaty," Austin
explains, "reaffirms and guarantees to the Din6 their socially distinct group
character and political character as a sovereign nation . . . .""
Like that of the United States, the Navajo Nation government is now
divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. But it has not always
been this way. The Tribal Council was originally established by the U.S.
government in the 1920s to facilitate non-Indian access to Navajo resources.1
And though there is now an office of President, until "the turmoil" of 1989 the
structure was more parliamentary, with the main leadership role held by the
12. Id. at xxi.
13. Id. at xxiii.
14. Id. at 2.
15. TRIu CHOUDHARY, Div. OF ECON. DEV., NAVAJO NATION, NAVAJO NATION DATA FROM
US CENSUS2000, at 1 (2001), available at http://navajobusiness.com/pdf/NNCensus 2000.pdf
(additionally noting that the total reservation population, including non-Indians and Indians of
other tribes, according to the 2000 Census was 180,462).
16. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 3.
17. The term was introduced by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). For an excellent article discussing what "domestic
dependent nation" status means for the Navajo Nation, see Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox ofthe Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109
(2004).
18. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 6.
19. Id. at 13.
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Chairman of the Council.20 Abuses of power and corruption by Chairman
MacDonald "spurred the 1989 government reforms that resulted in the present
three-branch government with checks and balances." 2 1 Not surprisingly-this
is a book written by a former Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court-Austin goes into the most detail when it comes to the history of the
Navajo Nation court system.
Professor David Wilkins writes of the Navajo court system: "The Navajo
judiciary is the youngest of the three branches of government yet . . . it is
unarguably the most respected institution in Navajo Nation government."22
The precursor to today's court system was the Navajo Court of Indian
Offenses, established by the U.S. government in 1892 and charged with
enforcing federal regulations on the reservation. 23 The judges of the Navajo
Court of Indian Offenses "drew from Navajo customs and traditional dispute
resolution methods to decide cases brought under the Bureau's criminal code,"
effectively manipulating an assimilative institution to reflect Din6 values and
meet Din6 needs.24 The Tribal Council created a separate and independent
Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation Government in 1958 that replaced the
earlier Navajo Court of Indian Offenses.25
A major challenge to the authority and separateness of the judiciary came
in 1977-1978 when the Council, under the direction of Chairman Peter
MacDonald, Sr., established the "Navajo Supreme Judicial Council."26 The
entire purpose of this body was to reverse decisions striking down actions of
the Council, and it was abolished after hearing three cases in 1985. Since
1985, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has been the highest judicial body of
the tribe and reviews cases from the ten judicial districts of the Navajo
Nation.28 The caseload of the Navajo court system, according to the first-
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 17. But see PETER MACDONALD WITH TED SCHWARZ, THE LAST WARRIOR:
PETER MACDONALD AND THE NAVAJO NATION 278-341 (1993) (offering a defense to the
bribery and corruption charges connected with the Big Boquillas Ranch purchase).
22. DAVID E. WIKINs, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 137 (1999).
23. AuSTIN, supra note 4, at 21.
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id. at 29.
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id. at 32; see also Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country
After Plains Commerce Bank: State Courts and the Judicial Sovereignty ofthe Navajo Nation,
33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 385, 392 (2008-2009) (noting that the 1985 reforms "confirmed the
Navajo court system in its current form and status, with a permanent Supreme Court and an




quarter report of 2010, was 29,656; the docket includes everything from civil
matters to traffic violations to domestic-violence cases.29
Customary law and practices play an important, arguably definitional, role
in the Navajo court system. Austin's second chapter is dedicated to
introducing the foundational Din6 law principles and the role they play before
the courts. The Navajo Nation offers some litigants the possibility of opting
into a dispute-resolution system, peacemaking, created in 1982 and based on
a traditional structure instead of an adversarial court system.o Even if litigants
choose to stay before a "regular" court, customary law is an important source
of law before all courts on the reservation. The central place of Navajo
customary law can be seen in the preference of the Navajo Nation courts for
"the term 'Navajo Common Law' rather than 'custom' for the reason that it is
not widely understood that the customs and traditions of the Navajo People are
law, and the English term is used because it more accurately reflects our
customs as law."31
The major contribution of Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law is the
depth of Austin's explanation of Navajo common law (given the Navajo
Nation judiciary's preference for the term "common law" over "customary
law," it will be used from here on in this article). After a brief discussion on
how common law is introduced and shown in court, Austin explains that
"spirituality underlies Din6 foundational laws" and that the h6zh6, k', and k'i
29. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, FIsCAL YEAR 2010: FIRST QUARTER
REPORT 45 (2010), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/CalendarPSAs/JB%20FY2010
%201 st%20Qrtr%/o20Rpt.pdf.
30. For more on Navajo peacemaking, see Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation's
Peacemaker Division: An Integrated, Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 297 (1999-2000); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice
Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175, 186-87 (1994) (written by a ChiefJustice of the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court); James W. Zion, The Dynamics ofNavajo Peacemaking, 14 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 58 (1998) (written by the only non-Indian who has served as a judge/facilitator in the
peacemaker courts).
31. In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 181 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983). Former Chief
Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court Tom Tso explains:
When we speak ofNavajo customary law, however, many people become uneasy
and think it must be something strange. Customary law will sound less strange
if I tell you it is also called "common law." Our common law is comprised of
customs and long-used ways of doing things. It also includes court decisions
recognizing and enforcing the customs or filling in the gaps in the written law.
Tom Tso, The Process ofDecision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 225,230 (1989).
For more on the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's preference for the term "common law" over
"customary law," see Ezra Rosser, Customary Law: The Way Things Were, Codified, 8 TRIBAL
L.J. 18, 20 (2007-2008).
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doctrines or values are among the most important general principles of Navajo
life that make up Navajo common law.32 For each of these three key doctrines,
Austin starts by introducing their traditional origins and significance and then
shows how they have been used by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. It is
worth noting at this point that I am not Din6, or even Indian, so there is a limit
to my understanding of these doctrines and Navajo common law even after
having read Austin's account of them.
English translations of words like h6zh6, k', and k'i capture only part of
the meaning of such terms. Austin's extended effort to define h6zh6 reflects
the problems of translation-in language and in culture-required for non-
Indians to understand traditional Dind values. Austin first introduces the
glossed definitions of h6zh6 that anthropologists have used: "harmony,
balance, beauty, goodness, blessed, pleasant, perfection, ideal, and other
attributes considered positive."33 Austin also considers a definition of hdzh6
equating it to perfection before settling on "that state of affairs where
everything is in its proper place and functioning in harmonious relationship to
everything else."34 Still later, Austin uses "good" for h6zh6.3 ' The translation
challenges of h6zhd are also true for k', k'i, and many other Dind traditional
values, from nalydh (restitution) to nabik'iyati (talk things out). Austin deals
with this by writing the Din6 words and then summarizing the significance of
particular terms, but the sense remains that the true meanings of these
traditional values are lost in translation.
A central goal of the Navajo courts is the restoration of h6zh6 (harmony).
Traditional ceremonies seek to eliminate or neutralize bad forces or monsters,
naayd', that cause disharmony in the community or in one's life.36 After
naaydd' create disharmony, these forces "are identified/isolated and then
matched to a specific ceremony," which then "returns things or beings
(humans included) to hdzh6."" Peacemaking processes that existed prior to
the current Navajo court system made use of h6zhd dispute-resolution
procedures, and these values have now been brought into the current
adversarial system by Navajo judges." Austin explains that the Navajo
common-law doctrine of h6zhd guided the Navajo Nation Supreme Court on
32. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 44.
33. Id. at 53.
34. Id. at 54 (quoting GARY WrfHERSPOON, NAvAJo KINSHI AND MARRIAGE 8 (1975)).
35. Id. at 59.
36. Id. at 60-61.
37. Id. at 61.




everything from citizen-standing requirements to the requirement of a case or
controversy.39 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court in Halona v. MacDonald,
a case arising out of corruption during Chairman MacDonald's term in office,
used the "traditional and abiding respect for the impartial adjudicatory
process" of Din6 people to uphold the right of the court to review Tribal
Council legislation. 40 Because Halona v. MacDonald helped establish the
authority of the judiciary, it has been analogized to Marbury v. Madison.4'
Similarly, in a more recent case, the supreme court used Navajo common-law
values of participatory democracy to strike down a ten-thousand-dollar pay
raise the Council gave itself.4 2
But h6zh6 is not limited to balance-of-power matters: it is "all-
encompassing" and "pervades everything in the traditional and contemporary
Navajo universe."' The Navajo Nation Supreme Court's role in restoring
harmony in domestic-relations cases, for example, led it to highlight the
importance of finality when there is a divorce and the way that traditional rules
regarding property division promote h6zhd." Austin writes that the hdzh6
concept "is the foundational backbone of Navajo philosophy" and, as such, is
important in every category of dispute heard by Navajo courts.45
The second traditional Navajo common-law doctrine that Austin presents
is k'd, which guides Din6 relationships with everything around them: people,
animals, holy beings, and the earth.46 K'd recognizes the "universal kinship"
that all beings, human and non-human, share and corresponds with norms
reflective of the relationships Din6 have with the world and with others.47
Austin explains that "the k'd doctrine describes the ideal relationship among
everyone in the Navajo world where values maintain relationships that produce
concord."48 Children are taught how to behave and relate to other Navajos and
39. Id. at 65-66.
40. 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 205 (Navajo 1978) (per curiatn), quoted in AUSTIN, supra note 4,
at 70.
41. Valencia-Weber, supra note 5, at 238 n.40.
42. AuSTIN, supra note 4, at 64-66 (discussing Judy v. White, 8 Navajo Rptr. 510 (Navajo
2004)).
43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 77-78.
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 83-84.
47. Id. at 83.
48. Id. at 84.
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relatives in accordance with k', which includes how elders should be
addressed and the obligations owed to relatives.49
Austin ends the book with k'di, the doctrine governing family and clan
relations, arguably a subset of k'6 but important enough itself to Navajo
culture to merit separate treatment. The overlap means, however, that Austin
introduces the clanship system in the k'd section. Dind society is matrilineal,
which means that children take the clan of their mothers and that women
traditionally controlled most property. Every full-blooded Navajo, however,
has four basic clans, and the norm when meeting people is to give an
introduction that traces clan connections back to the grandparent generation.
Such an introduction helps establish the relationships between people and their
clanship obligations, which can range from providing shelter to giving
financial support for major ceremonies.
Politics traditionally has been guided by k'-based principles that inform
expectations of governance processes and forms of Navajo leadership.
Traditionally, leaders were chosen for their persuasive abilities; those "adept
at 'talking things out' became successful leaders and enjoyed long service."so
Such skills were important because Navajo society valued egalitarianism and
a non-hierarchical, horizontal relationship between leaders and the people."
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court's notice of Navajo common law
regarding governance has led it to rule against legislation that in one way or
another stands in the way of the vibrant form of participatory democracy that
traditionally has been the norm in Navajo governance.52 Austin explains: "The
values that create an environment of k'd are, of course, respect, kindness,
friendliness, cooperation, use of kinship terms, and other positive values that
promote free-flowing discussion and consensual decision making."" K'6 also
reflects the high value of community in Dind society. "The maxim, 'it's up to
him,"' captures Dind respect for individual freedom54 and is balanced by the
admonishment "He (or she) acts as if he (or she) has no relatives," used when
someone violates k'd rules." Finally, Navajo Nation Supreme Court precedent
regarding the k' doctrine includes recognition of substantive rights in areas
such as due process, speech, and equity.
49. Id. at 85-89.
50. Id. at 90.
51. Id. at 91-93.
52. See id. at 101-05 (discussing three cases in which the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
struck down laws and practices that limited public participation).
53. Id. at 103.
54. Id. at 109.




Given the importance of family and clan for Navajos, it is not surprising
that Austin ends Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law with k'i and that
it is the largest chapter in the book. Austin primarily explains k 'di in relation
to the clan system and the regulation of domestic matters, though he also
discusses the relationship of k'i to land and grazing rights. An extended-
family structure is far more prevalent among Dind than is the norm among
non-Indians." Multiple generations and families often live together in
extended-family housing compounds." The clan system and an elaborate
system of kinship terms reflect the expansiveness of the relations
acknowledged by Navajos. The clan system means that a Navajo will have
"thousands of relatives, many of whom he or she will never meet during his
or her lifetime."" The relationship that one has with another Navajo helps
determine expectations and the roles played; for example, maternal
grandparents are responsible for passing along Din6 culture to grandchildren,
and relatives on the paternal side may contribute to the costs of major
ceremonies." For non-Indians accustomed to a smaller zone of concern, often
coterminous with the nuclear family, the Navajo system is both complex and
extensive by comparison.
Judicial recognition of the importance of clanship and extended family in
Dind society-in short, of k'di-impacts all of family law, including marriage,
divorce, alimony, child support, and inheritance. In this area of law, one of the
primary functions of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court is to sort out the legal
effect of traditional practices or ceremonies. For example, if customarily a
woman could divorce a man by putting his saddle outside their hooghan, the
traditional eight-sided wood-and-earth home of Din6, should courts recognize
this as a valid divorce today?o Although a book giving an overview of U.S.
law might relegate family law to a few pages, Austin's lengthy discussion of
domestic matters and k'i reflects the centrality Din6 place on family and clan
relationships.
Reservation land is held in trust by the tribe and the U.S. government, so
land control is mediated by grazing and land-use permits that are controlled
56. See In re A.M.K., No. SC-CV-38-10, at *10-11 (Navajo Oct. 8, 2010)
(Navajocourts.org) (contrasting Navajo and Anglo-American conceptions of the family); see
also Austin, supra note 4, at 184-85 (discussing the Navajo extended family concept).
57. Ezra Rosser, This LandIs My Land, This Land Is Your Land: Markets and Institutions
for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 245, 257 (2005).
58. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 139.
59. Id. at 141.
60. See id. at 168-71 (discussing the effect of contrary common law and Tribal Council
actions on this method of divorce).
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according to matrilineal descent rules." The role of k'di values regarding
domestic-relations cases is especially significant in light ofNavaj o conceptions
of sovereignty. According to Austin, Navajo "sovereignty, including nation
building, emanates from inside the hooghan (hogan) outwards to the Four
Sacred Mountains and beyond."62 While non-Indians may prioritize the state
or the state's monopoly on the use of force when thinking about sovereignty,
for Din6 the home is "the source of Navajo Nation sovereignty and Navajo
nation building, because Navajo culture, knowledge, language, spirituality,
identity, and all things that compose the Navajo Nation flow outwards from
inside the hogan."
Austin concludes with an eloquent and strongly stated summary of the
importance of Navajo courts and Navajo common law that is worth quoting at
length:
Navajo judges have proven that Navajo customs and traditions
work well at resolving legal disputes brought by Navajos and non-
Navajos alike. This book, it is hoped, will educate non-Indian state
and federal judges, including those on the U.S. Supreme Court,
who harbor or express antagonistic views of American Indian
customs and traditions and American Indian tribal courts in
general. Navajo common law and American Indian common law
are products of human experience, just as Euro-American common
law is the product of human experience. Thus, any suggestion that
Indian common law is so divergent that it should be confined to
matters involving only Indians on their reservations is unwarranted,
unsupportable, and smacks of extreme Euro-American
ethnocentrism, probably to the point of racial bias.'
Austin's conclusion may strike some readers as overly strong; after all, the
book's focus is Navajo courts and Navajo common law, not the antagonistic
views that non-Indian judges have about tribal law. But having shown the
origins, depth, and contemporary role of Navajo common law, Austin is
describing what is at stake for Indian communities and for non-Indian society
if judges, and non-Indians generally, fail to respect the significance of tribal
law.
61. Id. at 189-98.
62. Id. at 76.
63. Id. at 159.




II. Navajo Common Law and the Tribal Council
Austin could not have foreseen that today the biggest threat to Navajo
common law would come not from non-Indian judges but from the Navajo
Nation Council. The Council voted in January 2010 to impose severe
restrictions on the use of Navajo common law by the judiciary." Navajo
Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr. vetoed the legislation, but sixty-seven of
eighty-eight Council delegates voted to override the veto.66 The passage of the
legislation6 1 was an angry reaction by the Council to the role the judiciary
played, or threatened to play, in a proposal to reduce the size of the Council.
Although Navajo common law is codified as Din6 Fundamental Law or Din6
Foundational Law, the actions of the Council beg two related questions: just
how fundamental is Navajo common law to the law of the Navajo Nation and,
provocatively, can the Council can declare itself above the law and the will of
the people?
First, the back story on why the Council wants to limit how Navajo courts
can use Navajo common law arguably explains the Council's anger and fear.
A proposal to reduce the size of the Navajo Nation Council has dominated
Navajo politics since 2008; 18,000 people signed President Shirley's petition
to "reduce the Council from 88 to 24 members."6 8 Such support reflected
widespread dissatisfaction with the Council, but, perhaps fearing for theirjobs,
the Council attempted to block a voter initiative on the issue.6 9 The Navajo
Nation Supreme Court had to step in three times to ensure that the initiative,
and another initiative that would give the Navajo Nation President line-item-
65. See Jason Begay, Council Reinstates Limits on Ding Law, Expanded Legal Power,
NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Feb. 25, 2010, at Al.
66. Id. (listing how every delegate voted).
67. Navajo Nation Tribal Council, An Act Relating to Government Services, Judiciary and
Intergovernmental Relations; Enacting the Foundation of the Ding, Ding Law and Ding
Government Act of 2009; Amending 1 N.N.C. §200-207, Resolution No. CJA-08-10 (2010),
invalidatedby Office ofthe Navajo Nation President v. Navajo Nation Council, No. SC-CV-02-
10, at *47 (Navajo Aug. 2, 2010) (Navajocourts.org) [hereinafter Shirley v. Morgan]
(connecting the enactment of the Resolution with the Council's "dissatisfaction with a number
ofrecent decisions by the courts that have gone against the Council's partisan interests, in which
the courts have used Fundamental Law").
68. Jason Begay, Voters: 'Yes!': Majority ofDind Votefor 24-Member Council, Line-Item
Veto for President, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Dec. 17, 2009, at Al [hereinafter
Begay, Voters: 'Yes! 1.
69. Jason Begay, A Long, Twisting Road: People's Vote in Special Election Took a Year
ofLegal Wrangling, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Dec. 30, 2009, at A3 [hereinafter
Begay, A Long, Twisting Road].
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veto authority, would be put before the Navajo people.70 Tensions reached a
high point in October 2009, when the Council passed legislation putting
President Shirley on forced leave, suspending his presidency by a majority
vote.71 The drama surrounding the suspension was captured by a photo, which
appeared on the front page of the next edition of the Navajo Times, of a
sharpshooter looking down on the tribal offices in Window Rock.72
Although Shirley was allegedly suspended for involvement in two deals
where the Navajo Nation overpaid for telecommunications services, the timing
was suspicious. 73 The suspension followed weeks of bad press about the
Council using discretionary funds to channel money to relatives of members
of the Council or others connected to the Council,74 and it came as a deadline
for the initiative approached.75 Responding to yet another story about misuse
of discretionary funds, this one about a $9,999 check from the Council for
which records cannot be found, a frustrated Navajo wrote in a letter to the
editor of the Navajo Times: "Some of us still live in one-room homes without
70. See In re Navajo Nation Election Admin.'s Determination of Insufficiency Regarding
Two Initiative Petitions, No. SC-CV-28-09 (Navajo July 30, 2009) (Navajocourts.org); In re
Navajo Nation Election Admin.'s Determination of Insufficiency Regarding Two Initiative
Petitions, No. SC-CV-24-09 (Navajo June 22, 2009) (Navajocourts.org); In re Two Initiative
Petitions, No. SC-CV-41-08 (Navajo July 22, 2008) (Navajocourts.org).
71. Jason Begay, Turmoil, but No Riot: President's Leave Cloaked in Secrecy, but Court
Reinstates Shirley, NAVAJO TIMEs (Window Rock, Ariz.), Dec. 30, 2009, at A3 [hereinafter
Begay, Turmoil].
72. See Bill Donovan, Life Goes On, Despite Suspension, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock,
Ariz.), Oct. 29, 2009, at A3 (explaining that the sharpshooter was used because of concerns
regarding the reaction of Shirley supporters).
73. For the limited information released on the Navajo Nation's OnSat contract and
Shirley's involvement, see Begay, Turmoil, supra note 71. As the supreme court would later
highlight, because the "report was not shown to the President and never became public[,] ...
the contents of the report, including the basis for any of its findings, remain unknown to the
public to the present day." Shirley v. Morgan, No. SC-CV-02-10, at *42 (Navajo May 28,
2010) (Navajocourts.org). Note: having already been disappointed by the actions of a Navajo
leader, Chester Carl, whom I had looked up to, I am not passing judgment one way or another
on the OnSat allegations. See Ezra Rosser, Suspension ofIndian Housing Leader Impacts All
Tribes, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), Nov. 29, 2006, at A3.
74. See, e.g., Marley Shebala, Legislative Relatives Received $100,000: Total Given to Six
Family Members Since 2003 Breaks Century Mark, NAVAJO TIMEs (Window Rock, Ariz.), Oct.
8, 2009, at Al. The Navajo Times should be commended for bringing to light the Council's use
of discretionary funds. The Council and the Office of the President both refuse to release
records of how they spend discretionary funds, despite their choice to allocate ten percent of the
budget to such funds. Id.
75. The Navajo Election Administration had six months from June 25, 2009 to hold the




electricity and indoor plumbing while people that we trust are helping
themselves. We are forgotten."" Despite the efforts of the Council to derail
the proposed reduction of its size, over two days in mid-December the Council
was twice rebuked. First, on December 14, 2009, a Window Rock District
Court judge ruled that the Council's legislation suspending President Shirley
was "null and void";" the next day the initiative on reduction of the Council
to twenty-four members was "overwhelmingly approved.""
It is against this backdrop, particularly the very real possibility that most
delegates stand to lose their jobs, that the Council fired its most damaging
salvo at the Navajo court system. The actions of the Council with regard to
Navajo common law make it challenging to situate Navajo common law in
Navajo law generally. The Council in 1959 passed a choice-of-law statute
authorizing use of Navajo common law. In 2002, the Council amended the
Navajo Nation Code to "[r]ecognize the Fundamental Laws of the Dind."s
One way to look at the actions of the Council is contained in the title of the
Act, "[r]ecognize," suggesting that with regard to the judiciary the Council
was merely affirming what Navajo courts were already doing. The preamble
to the 2002 Act seems to state as much: "[T]he Navajo Nation Council has not
acknowledged and recognized such fundamental laws in the Navajo Nation
Code; instead the declaration and practice of these fundamental laws have, up
to this point in time, been left to those leaders in the Judicial Branch.""
Arguably, the Council was just playing catch-up with judicial development of
Navajo common law. But by asserting that Navajo common law is the highest
law, the Council perhaps was changing the law, requiring more of courts with
regard to Navajo common law.
76. Lisa Kennedy, Letter to the Editor, Must Be Nice to Write a Check to Yourself NAVAJO
TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Dec. 17, 2009, at A6.
77. Jason Begay, Judge Voids Shirley Ouster, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Dec.
17, 2009, at Al.
78. Begay, Voters: 'Yes!', supra note 68 (stating that the vote was 25,206 in support,
16,166 opposed).
79. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 45.
80. Navajo Nation Tribal Council, Amending Title 1 of the Navajo Nation Code to
Recognize the Fundamental Laws of the Dind, Resolution No. CN-69-02 (2002), available at
http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/CN-69-02Dine.pdf The resolution is now codified
at NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 1, §§ 201-206 (2008). For more on the passage of the
Fundamental Laws of the Dind, see Kenneth Bobroff, Ding Bi Beenahaz 'ianii: Codifying
Indigenous Consuetudinary Law in the 21st Century, 5 TRIBAL L.J. 4 (2004-2005).
81. Navajo Nation Tribal Council, Res. No. CN-69-02, at pmbl. 3.
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The 2002 Act refers to Din6 Fundamental Law as "immutable laws" and
explains that these laws are the foundation of Din6 sovereignty, government,
and the rights of Din6 as individuals.82 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court had
previously made similar statements, writing of Navajo common law as
"something written in stone . .. which is absolutely there; and, something like
the Anglo concept of natural law."" The court went on to describe this
"higher law" as akin to "unwritten constitutional law."84 Though these are
similar statements, with the 2002 Act the Council's statutory requirement that
fundamental law be given primacy arguably increased the authority of the
judiciary when it interprets Navajo common law." Although probably
unintentional, because tribal customs are not fully codified, tasking Navajo
courts to follow Din6 Fundamental Law involves accepting judicial notice and
use of custom when resolving disputes."
The question of whether the Council merely affirmed the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court's treatment of Navajo common law or changed the law with
passage of the Din6 Fundamental Law Act of 2002 and has the power to go
back and reverse itself remained open until the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court's simultaneous release of two linked decisions on May 28, 2010. The
Navajo Times called Shirley v. Morgan" and Nelson v. Initiative Committee
to Reduce Navajo Nation Council8 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's "most
wide-ranging decisions in its history."89 The Council's 2010 amendments
attempted to strip authority from Navajo courts and (non-cooperative) Navajo
judges. Based in part on the "non-traditional, non-consensual and adversarial"
nature of Navajo courts, the Council declared: "The courts of the Navajo
Nation shall not hear any disputes nor render any decisions on the
82. Id. at pmbl. $ 2 and tit. 1, § 2.
83. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 6 Navajo Rptr. 319, 324 (Navajo 1990).
84. Id. The Navajo Nation voted against an Indian Reorganization Act constitution in the
1930s by a vote of 8197 to 7679. MARSHA WEISIGER, DREAMING OF SHEEP IN NAVAJO
COUNTRY 179 (2009). For more on constitutional-reform efforts of Indian tribes, see
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONs (Eric
D. Lemont ed., 2006).
85. For more on the effect of the 2002 Act on the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's use of
Navajo common law, see Rosser, supra note 31, at 21-22.
86. See AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 50 ("[M]ost of the traditional normative precepts that
make up the modem body of Navajo common law have been identified and developed through
the legal doctrine of judicial notice.").
87. No. SC-CV-02-10 (Navajo May 28, 2010) (Navajocourts.org).
88. No. SC-CV-03-10 (Navajo May 28, 2010) (Navajocourts.org).
89. Bill Donovan, High Court Upholds Vote to Reduce Council to 24, NAVAJO TIMES




interpretation, application or validity of the Din6, Din6 Law and Dind
Government statute or its underlying core principles."o
The 2010 Act's findings explain that the Council's 2002 statute was neither
meant to "supersede duly-adopted" law nor to "delegate authority" regarding
the content of Din6 Fundamental Law.9' There is some irony to be found in
the 2010 action of the Council. The 2010 Act's findings acknowledge that the
judiciary's role is to interpret Navajo law, and the opening paragraph of the
amended Foundation of the Din6, Din6 Law and Din6 Government section
seems to recognize the importance of "maintaining respect for the specific
roles, responsibilities and authorities of the three branches of contemporary
Navajo Nation government." 92 The very same legislation, however, guts the
significance of Din6 Fundamental Law by making it little more than "a general
statement of guiding principles . .. [that] shall not be construed to create any
legally enforceable rights, entitlements or causes of action."93 And it is hard
to see how the Council is maintaining respect for the judiciary when it asserts
that Din6 Fundamental Law should not be "heard or resolved in the courts of
the Navajo Nation."94
Having lost the battle over whether there should be a voter initiative on the
size of the Tribal Council and not having had success with the Navajo Nation
President's suspension, the Council took aim at the . third branch of
government, the judiciary. In Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law,
Austin notes, "Of the three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), the
Navajo Nation Council (legislative branch) wields the most power."9 5 Austin
goes on to accuse the Council of refusing "to share power with the other two
branches." 96 Although issues of power-sharing between branches are muted
in most disputes heard by Navajo courts, the threat of a reduction in the size
of the Council put the Council on the defensive, and it lashed out with its 2010
amendments. The statement President Shirley issued when he vetoed the
initial legislation highlights the stakes:
90. Navajo Nation Tribal Council, Amending Title 1 of the Navajo Nation Code to
Recognize the Fundamental Laws ofthe Dind, Resolution No. CN-69-02, at § 5 (A)-(B) (2002),
available at http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/CN-69-02Dine.pdf.
91. Id. § 1(F); see also id. §§ 2, 200(B) (noting the same in the amended text for NAVAJO
NATION CODE tit. 1, § 200(B) (2008)).
92. Id. §§ 2, 200(A).
93. Id. §§ 2, 207(A)-(B).
94. Id. §§ 2, 207(D).
95. AuSTIN, supra note 4, at 90.
96. Id.
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Din6 Fundamental Law is the bedrock upon which Navajo society
and our Navajo government is built. By attempting to amend, and,
in essence repeal, its applicability, the Council is undermining all
we hold dear and that which identifies us specifically as Navajo,
distinct from other tribes or other governmental entities."
The Council's political tinkering with the place ofNavajo common law was
a transparent effort to protect itself and to prevent reduction in the size of the
Council from occurring. The Council, for good reason it turns out, was no
doubt particularly concerned about two cases on the docket of the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court: Shirley v. Morgan," appealing a lower court's ruling
that the Council's suspension of Shirley was null and void, and Nelson v.
Initiative Committee to Reduce Navajo Nation Council," reviewing an Office
of Hearings and Appeals dismissal of a challenge to the plan to reduce the
Council.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court's Shirley and Nelson opinions are
remarkable in many regards, from the manner of their delivery and the court's
related awareness of their importance to the strength and tone of their
arguments. The manner of the court's delivery of the two decisions
telegraphed the importance of the rulings: for the first time the court both gave
the decisions outdoors and broadcast them over a local radio station serving
the reservation. 0 This public pronouncement and oral delivery by the court
highlights the cases' importance for the Navajo Nation and the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court.' 1 The significance of the (re)assertion, found throughout the
cases, of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court's authority to exercise judicial
review of Council-enacted legislation is even suggested by the court's twice
citing Marbury v. Madison in the Shirley opinion.'02 Finally, Shirley and
Nelson are notable for the legal lengths to which the court went to reach its
holdings and the strong language-both in criticizing the Council and in
insisting on judicial review-found throughout the opinions.
97. Memorandum from Dr. Joe Shirley, Jr., President of the Navajo Nation, to Lawrence
T. Morgan, Speaker, Navajo Nation Council 1 (Feb. 12,2010) (vetoing Resolution No. CJA-08-
10).
98. No. SC-CV-02-10 (Navajo May 28, 2010) (Navajocourts.org).
99. No. SC-CV-03-10 (Navajo May 28, 2010) (Navajocourts.org).
100. Donovan, High Court, supra note 89.
101. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L.
REV. 4 (2008) (discussing the significance of oral dissents).





In Shirley, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court affirmed that the suspension
of President Shirley was improper and, in doing so, also struck down the
Council's amendments that purported to strip the judiciary of its ability to
interpret Fundamental Law. The court blamed the Council for having
"become so intransigent in its position" in the ongoing dispute between the
legislative and executive branches that it "purports to have authority to enact
a new statute that would reduce the discretion of our courts to question the
sources and complexion of our laws and governmental authority."o 3 Starting
with a discussion of responsibilities of government leaders according to k',
the court quickly addressed procedural issues" before holding that the
Council cannot declare legislation to be outside the purview of judicial
review.'os Recognizing that the Council was attempting to "encroach upon the
independence of the Judicial Branch," the court declared Resolution CJA-08-
10 invalid.'
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court used Shirley to connect the Navajo
Nation's current division of governance into three branches with Fundamental
Law. Arguing that separation of powers was based on a "borrowed" structure,
the Council claimed that there was no place for Fundamental Law in
adjudicating a dispute between branches.o7 By so claiming, the Council was
asserting itself as "the absolute source of governance for the Navajo
People."0 s The court responded by expressing its surprise and sadness that
elected leaders "believe that the government that they have been entrusted with
really is not a Din6 government, and that Dind values, principles, laws,
tradition and culture have nothing to do with our government structure.""'"
Connecting the position of the Council to the colonialism experienced by the
Din6, the court emphasized the continuing indigenous aspects of the Navajo
Nation government and unapologetically stated that it was "obligated to
respond in blunt manner" to the assertions of the Council."0
The three-branch government was formally created in 1989 as a reaction to
the "turmoil" of the MacDonald period."' But according to the court, the
103. Shirley, at *3 (Navajocourts.org).
104. Id. at *4-10.
105. Id. at *12.
106. Id. at *15.




110. Id. at *18.
Ill. Id. at *19.
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formal structure reflects the lesson that power should not be concentrated,"'
which can be seen in an emergence story recounted by the court. In the story,
a question about who should be made leader of the People was ultimately
resolved by the decision that power should be shared among four leaders-a
wolf, a bluebird, a mountain lion, and a hummingbird-each with its own
unique contributions to the People.'13  Finally, the court contrasted the
decisions of the Council immediately following the 1989 turmoil that
recognized that the People, not the Council, are the source of governance, with
the more recent decisions of the Council that "strayed from the course."" 4 in
affirming a trial court's holding that President Shirley had been wrongly
suspended, the court continued to call the Council to account. Discussing the
suspension resolution, the court admonished the Council: "The process of its
enactment is notable for secrecy, haste, disregard for persuasive Navajo Nation
legal authority, and the shabbiest of shabby treatments of the President, both
individually and in his Office, in violation of the fundamental principle of
k'9." us
The Council suffered a second blow on the same day when the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court announced in Nelson that the overwhelming results of
the voter initiative to reduce the size of the Council would stand."' If
Shirley's significance can be found in the direct manner which the court
reaffirmed its power of judicial review, the legal maneuvering found in the
Nelson opinion is similarly remarkable. The Council's best argument against
the initiative was a strong one: by statute, changes to the "fundamental
character of the Navajo government, like the size of the Council," seemingly
could not be approved by a simple majority vote."'7 The terms of the statute
provide that such changes must be "approved by majority vote of all
registered voters in all precincts."" 8 For those in favor of the reduction of
the Council, the vote seemed to stumble in two respects. First, though
approved by an overwhelming majority, because only "44% of registered
voters cast ballots,""' the initiative was not approved by a majority of
registered voters. Second, in a few chapters or precincts, the initiative was not
112. Id. at *23.
113. Id. at *21-23.
114. Id at *28.
115. Id. at *42-43.
116. Nelson v. Initiative Comm. to ReduceNavajo Nation Council, No. SC-CV-03-10, at * 18
(Navajo May 28, 2010) (Navajocourts.org).
117. Id. at *13.
118. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 2, § 102(A) (2008).




approved by a majority even though nationwide it was. The initiative cleared
these hurdles when the court, looking to the importance of participatory
democracy contained both in Fundamental Law and the post-1989
restructuring of the Navajo government, held that a simple majority was
sufficient for an initiative to pass.12 o Characterizing the statute as requiring "an
extraordinary majority impossible to be attained" based on past-election voter
turnout and different precinct results,12' the court reduced the statutory
requirement to only a simple majority of those voting.
Together, the Shirley and Nelson opinions reflect the best of the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court. Read out of context, the Nelson opinion by itself
seems of lesser importance, but the statutory interpretation in which the court
engaged to ensure that the People's voice would be heard in Nelson reflects the
affirmation both of judicial review and Fundamental Law found in Shirley.
And although the court in both cases was critical of the Council, it
subsequently showed its impartiality in the ongoing dispute between the
legislative and executive branches by upholding a statutory prohibition on the
Navajo Nation President running for a third consecutive term. The court did
not agree with President Shirley that the statutory prohibition violated the Din6
concept that the People should be able to choose their leaders.'22 Following
the publication of Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law, the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court found itself in the position of having to (re)assert its
Marbury-esque power of judicial review and authority to rely on Navajo
common law. The matters being adjudicated-the suspension of the Navajo
President and an effort to change the nature of the Council-were important
in their own right, but equally significant is the court's demonstrated
willingness and ability to draw on all forms of legal authority, including
Navajo common law.
Debate about the use and role of Navajo common law is good. In a letter
to the editor of the Navajo Times motivated by the Council's 2010 Act, Austin,
120. Id. at *14-18. In a case of dueling memos, the Navajo Nation Attorney General came
to the same conclusion in an April 2008 memorandum on the issue, but a memorandum by the
Chief Legislative Council reached the opposite conclusion. See Louis Denetsosie, Opinion of
the Attorney General of the Navajo Nation: Vote Requirements of the Din6 to Enact Legislation
by Means of the Initiative Process (Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with author); Memorandum from
Frank M. Seanez, Acting Chief Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Council to Lawrence
T. Morgan, Speaker, Navajo Nation Council (May 12, 2008) (discussing the vote requirements
to pass an initiative) (on file with author).
121. Nelson, at *17 (Navajocourts.org).
122. Todacheene v. Shirley, No. SC-CV-37-10, at *11-12 (Navajo Aug. 2, 2010)
(Navajocourts.org).
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together with former Navajo President Peterson Zah, former Chief Justice
Robert Yazzie, and Manley Begay, Jr., of the Native Nations Institute,
cautioned against "weaken[ing] Din6 Foundational Laws in any manner for
political expediency.""' Given that Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law
can be read as a celebration both of Navajo common law and how the Navajo
Nation Supreme Court has incorporated the doctrines of h6zh6, k'd, and k'di
that make up the common law, Austin's position in such a debate is well
established. In the same letter to the editor, Austin calls Navajo common law
"a shining example of Din6 cultural strength and political sovereignty at
work."'24 Others may feel differently, however, and the Navajo Nation
government would likely be improved by a lengthy public debate on the use
and role of Navajo common law before the courts. But instead, because the
Council arguably acted to determine the outcome of cases involving the
Council that were already on appeal, the Navajo Nation had to pass through
something like a constitutional, or in this case an unwritten constitutional,
crisis.
Conclusion
Even after reading Austin's work, the extent to which non-Indians, or non-
Din6 for that matter, can fully understand or internalize the role the Navajo
creation story or the clan system plays in Navajo common law is limited.
Implicit in this recognition is the importance of maintaining and supporting a
separate and independent Navajo judicial system with jurisdiction over the
reservation. Awareness that Navajo beliefs and customs can be only partly
translated out of the Navajo language and cultural experience is a necessary
component of affirming the role tribal courts play in protecting tribal lifeways.
As the Navajo Nation Supreme Court noted at the end of its decision in
Shirley: "Our culture is best known through interactions and experience, not
through interpretations and secondary sources. We exhort those advising our
government and those practicing in our courts to seek out knowledge by going
123. Raymond D. Austin et al., Letter to the Editor, Lessening Dind Law Would Return Us
to the Dark Ages, NAvAJo TIMEs (Window Rock, Ariz.), Feb. 11, 2010, at A7 (signed by
Raymond Austin, Manley Begay, Jr., Robert Yazzie, and Peterson Zah). Zah is a former
President of the Navajo Nation; Yazzie is a former Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court; Begay is the Director of the Native Nations Institute at the Udall Center for Studies in
Public Policy and Codirector of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic





among our Din6 people and experiencing the Din6 way of life first-hand."l 25
The issues raised by the Navajo Nation Council's attack on a strong and
binding role for Navajo common law is being, and should be, resolved by the
Navajo Nation and not by non-Indians, especially non-Indian academics. 126
That being said, my hope is that Din6 voters will hold their elected officials
accountable for trying to make the Council the sole arbiter of law in the
Navajo Nation and failing to live up to their obligations as tribal leaders.127 "In
the Navajo world, privileges, rights, duties, and mutual obligations must be
identified," Austin explains, "relationships and kinship unity must be
maintained, and the universe's multifarious elements must remain in
harmony."l 28 It remains to be seen whether the current power struggles
occurring within the Navajo Nation will be resolved in a way that accords with
Dind values of hdzh6, k', and k'di.
125. Shirley v. Morgan, No. SC-CV-02-10, at *47 (Navajo May 28, 2010)
(Navajocourts.org).
126. The latest move of the Council to strike a blow against the independence of the
judiciary involves putting before the voters a referendum on replacing the current judicial-
nomination system with a system of elected judges, including electing the members of the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court. See Noel Lyn Smith, Move to Elect Judges a Step Closer to
Vote, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), June 24, 2010, at Al. Ironically, the Council's
implicit reliance on Nelson in using this process will present a novel challenge to the court if
such a referendum is approved by a majority of voters.
127. For more on the challenges of identifying and labeling tribal leadership and actions of
tribal governments as good or bad and the need to avoid imposing non-Indian norms, see
Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
128. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 135.
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